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ABSTRACT

Previous research has indicated that moderate
levels of suspicion will enhance deception detection
accuracy.

This study hypothesized that combining

state suspicion and trait suspicion
personality traits)

(i.e.

antisocial

in order to create a moderate

level of suspicion overall would produce a higher
detection accuracy than would be found among
individuals who were not suspicious.

Participants

consisted of 133 UNLV undergraduates, who completed
the Antisocial subscale of the Milion Clinical
Multiaxial Inventory-II.

Participants were assigned

to a no suspicion or moderate suspicion condition,
viewed a videotape of
deceptive,

persons being truthful or

judged videotape actors as being truthful

or untruthful, and rated their own degree of
suspicion.

Results did not confirm the original

hypothesis, but did indicate that persons high in
antisocial traits were more suspicious than those low
in such traits, and subjects not primed to be
suspicious made more veracity judgments than those
who were primed to be suspicious.

Ill
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Deception can be defined as any intentional
verbal or nonverbal act performed for the purpose of
directing another away from the "truth", as
conceptualized by the deceiver
1983).

(Riggio & Friedman,

Essentially every person has deceived another

at some point in their lives, whether it involved an
exaggeration of truth, a statement of only partial
truth, a simple white lie, or a boldfaced lie of
serious magnitude

(Ford, King & Hollander,

1988).

Deception lies embedded in nearly every type of
interpersonal relationship, occurring among friends,
family members,

lovers, colleagues, and strangers

(Zuckerman, DePaulo & Rosenthal,

1981) .

The impact

of such deception may potentially affect
occupational,

familial, social, and psychological

functioning.
A large body of research has examined the
ability of humans to detect deception,

and found that

in general, human accuracy in detecting deception is
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low.

Prior studies have reported accuracy scores

seldom above 65 percent, with 50 percent being the
chance level.

Accuracy scores for individual studies

include the following:

Harrison et al., 1978, 62

percent; Kraut & Poe, 1980, 46 percent; Lavrakas &
Maier,

1979, 54 percent; Maier & Janzen, 1967, 61

percent; Maier & Thurber,

1968,

72 percent ; and

Matarazzo et al., 1970, 59 percent.
Obviously,

there exists many circumstances when

an individual is better off deciphering the truth
than being deceived, particularly when the sender is
acting in a way that will be harmful,
otherwise damaging to the receiver
1984).

insulting, or

(DePaulo et a l .,

The ability to detect deception becomes

increasingly important when it can be used to prevent
such harmul actions.

Therefore, discovering the true

effects of influential variables in deception
detection is not only a matter of theoretical
importance, but also of practical importance.
Several factors play an important role in an
individual's ability to detect deception, including
the interpretation of behavioral cues that are leaked
by the deceiver, as well as detector experience,
familiarity,

age, personality, and level of

suspicion.
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Behavioral Correlates of Deception
Behavioral correlates of deception have often
been examined in deception research.

There are

several factors that may cause a deceiver to produce
cues that lead to his or her detection.

Four main

factors include emotion, arousal, control, and
cognitive processing (Zuckerman et al., 1981).
Two emotional states generally associated with
lie telling include guilt and anxiety (e.g.,
et al., 1974; Kraut,

1980).

Knapp

Since guilt and anxiety

are both negative emotions, persons engaging in
deception may manifest negative behaviors associated
with such emotions.

For example,

cues may become less pleasant

facial and vocal

(Zuckerman et al.,

1981), and negative statements are often made more
often.

Another indicator of anxiety is the use

"adaptors"

(Ekman & Friesen,

1972), which are

behaviors designed to satisfy some self-need, such as
scratching or grooming.

In order to minimize the

negative experience of lie telling, an individual may
attempt to dissociate himself or herself from the lie
by making fewer self-references, or by becoming
withdrawn or evasive.

This is indicated by

attempting to change the conversation, decreasing eye
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contact, and increasing the distance from the
individual being deceived.
A second major factor contributing to a
deceiver's behavioral manifestations is that of
psychophysiological arousal
Podlesny & Raskin,

(e.g., Lykken,

1977; Waid & Orne,

1974;

1981) .

arousal may produce increased heart rate,

Such

increased

sweat production, pupil dilation, and increased blood
pressure.

Davis

(1961) suggests that the arousal

occuring during deception can be explained by three
possibilities:

the conditioned response theory, the

punishment theory, and the conflict theory.

The

conditioned response theory suggests that telling a
lie produces an autonomic response because in the
past, lying has been conditioned to negative
consequences.

Punishment theory explains the

increased autonomic responsivity by linking it to
anticipated punishment if the lie is detected.

The

conflict theory claims the enhanced autonomic
response results from a consequence of conflicting
truth and lie telling tendencies.

Assuming that

deception does evoke increased arousal,
studies by Zuckerman et al.

a review of

(1981) suggests that

aside from psychophysiological arousal, deception is
also associated with increased eyeblink rate.
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increased voice pitch, and a large number of speech
errors and hesitations.
A third factor related to the behavioral cues of
deception is attempted control.

Such controlled

behavior may appear rehearsed, planned, and lacking
in spontaneity (Zuckerman et al.,
Additionally,

1981).

individuals engaging in deception may

"try too hard", and thus produce a performance that
is too smooth or excessive
Furthermore,

(Knapp et al., 1974).

if deceivers are unable to control all

channels simultaneously, discrepancies are likely to
occur; for instance, face and voice or face and body
expressions may appear to convey different messages
(Zuckerman et al., 1981).

Such channel effects in

the detection of deception specifically refer to

the

modes by which cues to deception are "leaked" by the
deceiver, and subsequently used by the detector in
deciding whether or not deception is occuring.

The

facial channel includes facial cues above the neck,
the body channel includes cues from the neck down,
the face and body channel includes cues examined from
only a partial view of the upper body, and the speech
channel includes examinations of deceivers' unaltered
speech (Zuckerman et al., 1981).

Ekman and Friesen

(1969a) found that when individuals used facial cues
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while attempting to detect deception,

their accuracy

was actually lower than detection attempted without
the use of facial c u e s .
Zuckerman et al.

A review of studies by

(1981) found that when body cues

become available to the detector, accuracy does
increase, and when speech cues become available,
accuracy increases even more.

Comparing face, body,

and speech cues as single channels reveals the
following order of detection accuracy in standard
deviation units :
(.05)

speech (1.09), body

(.43), and face

(Zuckerman et al., 1981).

A variable that may influence a deceiver's
attempted control and arousal, and thereby affect his
or her manifestations of behavioral cues is that of
motivation.

The evidence relating to the effects of

motivation on a deceiver is, however,

inconclusive.

A highly motivated deceiver may try harder and
therefore be more successful at deceiving,

or the

increased motivation could produce increased anxiety
which may interfere with successful deception
DePaulo, Davis, & Lanier,

1980).

(e.g.,

Alternatively,

the

less motivated liar may not do well at masking the
deceptive information, but he or she may be less
likely to leak deception cues
1981).

(Zuckerman et al.,

This suggests that the relationship between
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deception ability and motivation may be curvilinear,
with optimum performance at an intermediate level,
where deceivers are somewhat motivated to
successfully lie, but not too highly aroused where
they will leak deception cues

(Zuckerman et al.,

1981) .
Finally,

cognitive factors influence a

deceiver's behavior by causing more cues to leak as
cognitive complexity increases.

Quite obviously,

creating a lie, much less the details of a lie, is
more difficult than telling the truth.

A deceiver

must create a message that contains no logical
inconsistencies or contradictions of what the
detector may already know (Zuckerman et al., 1981) .
Thus,

individuals are expected to require more time

to prepare deceptive messages as opposed to truthful
ones.

Goldman-Eis1er (1968) found that subjects who

are required to make cognitively complex statements
take more time to begin responding and hesitate more
when speaking.

Increased pupil dilation

(Kahneman,

1973) and decreased accompanying hand movements
(Ekman & Friesen,

1972) have also been found to occur

when an individual communicates cognitively complex
messages.

Assuming that lie telling is indeed a

cognitively complex task, the aforementioned
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behaviors should occur with increased frequency when
a person engages in deception.
Reasons for Low Accuracy
Although lie telling is associated with certain
behaviors, often such cues are interpreted the wrong
way or are not even noticed (Riggio & Friedman,
1983).

A review of studies by Zuckerman et al.

(1981), indicates that persons are perceived as being
more deceptive when they shift their posture more,
smile less, gaze less, take longer to answer a
question, and speak slower.

Accordingly, none of

these behaviors are associated with actual deception
in a statistically significant manner
al., 1981).

(Zuckerman et

On the other hand, perceivers also tend

to judge others as being more deceptive when the
messages are filled with errors and hesitations,

and

delivered in a high-pitched tone of voice, all of
which are associated with actual deception (Zuckerman
et al., 1981).

The lack of perfect correspondence

between actual cues to deception and perceived cues
to deception has important implications for both
truth-tellers and liars

(DePaulo et al.,

1984).

First, perhaps simply telling the truth is not
sufficient if one wants to be perceived as being
honest.

Certain individuals may have to make a
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conscious effort at appearing honest by changing
their normal behavioral cues.

Second, liars who wish

to effectively deceive others need only be aware of
cues that others may perceive as signs of deception,
rather than cues that really are associated with
deception

(DePaulo et al.,

Conversely,

1984).

for detectors of deception,

actual

cues are obviously more important that perceived cues
to deception.

An important step in training

individuals to become more accurate at detecting
deception would be educating them of the
discrepancies between perceived and actual cues to
deception.

Increasing awareness of such

discrepancies would call attention to common
judgmental errors

(DePaulo et al., 1984), and should

therefore improve detection accuracy.

It is

unlikely, however, that detectors will learn of such
discrepancies through their own experience,

since

i t 's probably unlikely that they will receive
accurate evidence that the sender is actually telling
a lie

(DePaulo et al., 1984).

Even if such feedback

is available, receivers may selectively focus on and
remember those behaviors that were parallel with
their own "theory" of how people act when they're
lying (e.g., Anderson, Lepper,

& Ross, 1980).

In the
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laboratory, however,

it is possible to draw subjects'

attention to possible revealing sources of cues to
deception, and to directly test such effects on
detection accuracy.
(1982)

DePaulo, Lassiter, and Stone

performed a study in which subjects were

divided into groups, each of which was instructed to
pay attention to specific cues.

Subjects in one

group were told to pay particular attention to w o r d s .
Subjects in another group were given a booklet that
suggested they pay particular attention to tone of
voice.

The third group was instructed to attend to

visual cues, while a control group was given no
special instructions.

All subjects then watched

videotapes of senders who were both telling the truth
and lying.

The attend-to-tone subjects had the best

performance on the subsequent lie detection task,
performing significantly better than controls, and
followed closely by the attend-to-words group.

The

attend-to-visual subjects did no better than controls
on the detection task.

This study suggests that

prompting subjects to take advantage of particular
cues to deception can improve lie detection accuracy.
Experience _and Detection Accuracy
Although behavioral cues serve as important
factors in the detection of deception, experience in
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detection seems to play a less prominent role.

Kraut

and Poe (1980) examined differences in detection
accuracy on the basis of experience by setting up
mock customs examinations.

They evaluated the

differences between experienced customs inspectors
and laypersons in their decisions to search
travelers, some of whom were "smugglers".

Using

verbal and nonverbal cues, the subjects were to
identify those individuals they believed were
smugglers, as evidenced by their decision to search
those travellers.

It was found that customs

inspectors were no more accurate than laypersons in
deciding which travellers to search.

Additionally,

customs inspectors who had made the largest number of
seizures in the previous year were no more accurate
in deciding who to search than the less successful
ones.

Similarly, Hendershot and Hess

(1982)

conducted a study in which undergraduates and police
detectives observed interrogations of students who
had or had not committed a mock crime, and found that
the detectives were no more accurate than
undergraduates in their judgments of innocence or
guilt.
Ekman and O'Sullivan

(1991) examined differences

in detection accuracy among various occupational
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groups.

A videotape consisting of ten people either

lying or telling the truth was shown to 509
individuals.

These included members of the U.S.

Secret Service, Central Intelligence Agency, National
Security Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigations,
Drug Enforcement Agency, California police officers
and judges, as well as working adults, psychiatrists,
and college students.

Subjects were to correctly

differentiate deceivers from non-deceivers after
viewing the videotape.

It was found that only the

Secret Service agents were significantly more
accurate than the others in detecting deception.
Publicness of Interactions
Another factor that influences deception
detection accuracy is the publicness of the
interaction.

Several investigators have suggested

that people tend to act differently in public versus
private situations; specifically, people tend to
control their behavior more carefully in public
situations

(Zuckerman et al., 1981).

Ekman & Friesen

(1969b) proposed the term "display rules" for the
norms that control appropriate public behavior.
deceptive communication, public

In

(face-to-face)

situations offer a special advantage to the deceiver,
who can change his or her deceptive strategy

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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according to the perceiver's reactions
al., 1976).

Thus,

(Krauss et

it appears that deceiving another

individual is easier and detecting such deception is
more difficult in a public interaction.
al.

Krauss et

(1976) had deceivers and interviewers interact

either face-to-face or by an intercom system.
Deception detection accuracy was higher in the
intercom condition, particularly when interviewers
could observe deceivers' faces.

Since the deceivers

in the intercom condition knew that their voices were
being monitored but did not know they were being
observed,

they may have controlled their voices while

neglecting to control their facial expressions
(DePaulo, 1980).

In another study that examined cue

leakage in public and private interactions,
et al.

(1979)

Feldman

found that when subjects were asked to

lie about their taste of a sample beverage,

they

experienced greater leakage of their true opinion in
the private condition than in the public condition.
On a related note, Buller et al.

(1991)

found that

conversational participants attributed more truth to
interviewees than observers did.

The experiment was

designed to compare deception detection skills of
conversational

(face-to-face) participants and

observers of such interactions.

Each of fifty
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observers viewed videotaped interactions between an
interviewer

(conversational participant)

interviewees.

and two

Conversational participants were found

to be less accurate than observers in the detection
of deception.

It appears that detection accuracy is

higher when the detector and deceiver do not engage
in face-to-face, direct contact

(Zuckerman et al.,

1981) .
Age and Deception Detection
Detector age is another variable that may
influence deception detection accuracy.

Children are

generally not as adept as adults in detecting
deception because understanding the concept of
deception is a process that develops over the course
of the elementary school years.

It takes time for

children to realize that people's overt expressions
do not always coincide with their internal states
(DePaulo et al., 1984).

Deception detectors must

also l e a m defining features of a lie :

it is a

message that the deceiver knows is false, and it is
designed to mislead

(DePaulo et al., 1984).

Additionally, children must learn behavioral cues to
deception and l e a m to recognize when those cues are
occuring.

Even when nonsubtle cues are presented to

children, considerable difficulties remain in their
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ability to detect deception (Winner, Rosenstiel,
Gardner, 1976).

&

Inconsistencies between different

aspects of a message

(i.e. verbal versus nonverbal)

are often not apparent to children, and even when
they are, the tactics used to resolve such
discrepancies are very different than those used by
adults

(DePaulo et al., 1984).

Children's difficulty

in resolving inconsistent cues has sometimes been
attributed to their limited capacity to process
information, and to their increased willingness to
accept adults' statements as true and credible
(DePaulo et al., 1984).

Skepticism about the

credibility of adults' statements does increase with
age

(Ackerman, 1983).

There is also evidence that

suggests that throughout adolescence,

individuals are

continually gaining new skills, experience, and
strategies that facilitate lie detection accuracy,
such as cultural, social, and interpersonal knowledge
(DePaulo et al., 1984).

DePaulo, Jordan,

Irvine, and

Laser (1981) tested deception detection abilities in
sixth-, eighth-, tenth-, and twelfth-graders and
college students.

Results showed a linear increase

in detection accuracy as age increased.
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Familiarity and Deception Detection
Another variable related to detection accuracy
is the degree of familiarity between receivers and
senders.

Miller et al.

(1986) suggested that having

truthful baseline information may be necessary for
accurate deception detection,
behavior is idiosyncratic.

since much deceptive

Thus,

it is expected that

as individuals become more familiar with each other,
or as a relationship develops,
deception should increase.

the ability to detect

For instance, Knapp

(1984) hypothesized that detection accuracy would be
higher between intimates than between friends, and
higher between friends than between acquaintances.
Yet research supporting this hypothesis is limited.
Two general procedures have been used in studies
examining the effects of baseline information on
judgments of truthfulness

(Stiff et al., 1992).

One

such procedure involves exposing observers to samples
of a target's truthful behavior,

and thereby

experimentally manipulating familiarity.
Miller, and Hocking (1980a, 1980b,

Brandt,

1982) performed

several studies that utilized this procedure, which
basically defines "familiarity" as exposure to
different amounts of truthful information.
these studies

In one of

(1980b), Brandt et al. compared

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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detection accuracy of observers who had not seen a
videotape of the target's truthful behavior to the
accuracy of observers who had viewed the videotape
three times.

Results did show a significant positive

effect for familiarity (65.6 percent mean accuracy in
the familiarity condition as compared to 42 percent
mean accuracy in the no-familiarity condition).
another study

In

(1982), Brandt et al. showed the

videotape of targets'

truthful behavior either two,

one, or zero times to observers before veracity
judgments were made.

Results showed that subjects

who had viewed the baseline videotape once or twice
were significantly more accurate than those subjects
who had not seen the videotape.

A similar third

study (1980a) by Brandt and associates examined
individuals who had seen a truthful videotaped
segment zero, one, three, or six times.

Across the

first three conditions, detection accuracy increased
with familiarity; however, subjects who had viewed
the segment six times were only slightly more
accurate than subjects who had not seen the segment
at all.

Overall, the Brandt, Miller, and Hocking

studies offer some evidence that increased
familiarity increases deception detection accuracy.
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The second general procedure for studying
familiarity and detection accuracy examines
familiarity in the context of natural relationship
development.

Comadena

(1982) compared the accuracy

of friendship dyads and married couples in detecting
lies about both emotional and factual material.

It

was found that spouses were significantly more
accurate at detecting deception than friends,
regardless of the type of lie.

Miller et al.

(1981)

examined detection accuracy between spouses, close
friends, and strangers concerning truthful or
deceptive responses to a videotape.

Interestingly,

it was found that friends were significantly more
accurate than spouses or strangers when judging
emotional material, and that spouses,

strangers, and

friends were no different in their ability to detect
deception relating to factual material.

In general,

studies which have investigated the influence of
familiarity on deception detection accuracy have not
found strong evidence for the presumed increase in
detection accuracy between individuals with a high
degree of familiarity.

Suspicion and Detection Accuracy
A number of studies have investigated the
effects of suspicion

on deception detection
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accuracy.

While it is often assumed that

situationally-induced suspicion will improve an
individual's ability to detect deception, previous
research has produced mixed results.
Toris and Depaulo
situation,

(1985) set up a mock interview

in which applicants acted either honestly

or dishonestly in presenting themselves as introverts
or extroverts.

Some interviewers were primed to be

suspicious, whereas the others were not.

No

significant relationship between suspicion and
accuracy in detecting deception was found.

However,

subjects who were primed to be suspicious were more
likely to judge their partner as being deceptive.
Similar results were found by Stiff, Kim, and
Ramesh (1992) in studying the effects of suspicion on
deception detection accuracy between relational
partners.

One partner was assigned the role of

interviewee, who was either truthful or deceptive
regarding his or her emotional reaction to a video.
The other partner was given the role of interviewer,
who was either primed or not primed to be suspicious.
Following the video presentation,

the interviewer

made judgments regarding his or her partner's
truthfulness regarding the emotional reaction.
Although increased suspicion lead to greater
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judgments of deception,

it did not improve accuracy

in detecting deception.
M c C o m a c k and Levine

(1990) argued that the

"all-or-none" approach to operationalizing suspicion
may not be sufficient in discovering its true effect
on detecting deception.

Prior studies using a

prime/no prime suspicion manipulation have found no
effect for suspicion on accuracy, perhaps because the
true relationship is non-linear.

Individuals who are

not primed to be suspicious are likely to perceive
all messages as truthful

(McCornack & Parks,

1986),

whereas individuals who are highly suspicious are
likely to perceive all messages as deceptive
Sc.

McComack,

1989) .

(Levine

Thus, a comparison between the

two groups should find no differences in accuracy,
because all judgments will be affected by the
respective bias.

Consequently, McCornack and Levine

(1990) hypothesized that individuals who are
moderately suspicious will be more accurate than
those who are minimally suspicious and those who are
highly suspicious.
the hypothesis,

The results were consistent with

indicating considerable

curvi1inearity.
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Personality Characteristics Influencing Detection
Accuracy
Although prior research has found that on
average persons do not detect deception at better
than chance levels,
exist.

large individual differences do

That is, some subjects perform better than

others.

This suggests that there may be certain

types of persons that have a superior ability to
detect deception.

Prior research on deception and

individual differences has often focused on such
variables as gender and self-monitoring.
M c C o m a c k and Parks

(1990) evaluated detection

accuracy among 55 premarital dyads.

Subjects viewed

12 videotaped segments of their relational partner,
who lied in half the segments and told the truth in
the other half.

Differences in detection accuracy

were found for couples of different levels of
intimacy,

as well as for gender; women were

consistently more accurate than men in discerning
truth that lies within deception.

Hall

(1984) also

found that women were more successful at decoding
non-verbal cues to deception than men.
Maier and Lavrakas

Additionally,

(1976) and DePaulo and Rosenthal

(1979) found higher detection rates for female
detectors.

However, DePaulo et al.

(1980) and
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Hocking et al.

(1979) found detection accuracy to be

lower for female detectors than for male detectors.
A few studies have examined self-monitoring in
conjunction with ability to detect deception.
self-monitoring scale developed by Snyder

A

(1974) not

only measures the ability to control expressive
behavior, but also measures sensitivity to the social
behavior of others.

Thus,

high self-monitors should

possess a superior ability to detect deception
because they are more adept at "reading" the social
behavior of others.

A summary of studies indicates

an increased accuracy in detecting deception among
high self-monitors versus low self-monitors, but
Zuckerman et al.
not reliable

(1981) states that this finding is

(mean = .04, combined z = 1.13).

Antisocial Personalities and Detection
The present study examines the possibility that
individual differences in antisocial personality
traits affect the ability to detect deception.
Individuals who manifest a large number of antisocial
personality traits could potentially be diagnosed
with Antisocial Personality Disorder.

According to

the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association,

1994),

these individuals generally disregard and violate the
rights of others, as demonstrated by a failure to
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conform to social norms regarding lawful behavior, a
reckless disregard for the safety of self or others,
lack of remorse, consistent irresponsibility
regarding major personal obligations, aggressiveness,
impulsivity, and deceitfulness,

as indicated by

repeated lying, conning others, or using aliases
(American Psychiatric Association,

1994).

These

persons are notorious for lying in order to avoid
punishment, gain rewards, manipulate others, and
sometimes for no reason at all
some of these individuals,

(Doren, 1987).

For

lying becomes the normal

mode of interaction with others.

They are skillful

liars, who take pride in their ability to tell
outrageous lies in a convincing manner

(Wells,

1988).

Some antisocial individuals live their lives as
impostors,

surviving by constantly telling one

fantastic lie after another.

They are "willing to go

to great lengths to achieve the ultimate deception"
(Wells, 1988, p. 847).

Cleckley's

(1982) classic

description of antisocial behavior also recognizes
constructs of untruthfulness and insincerity,

as does

nearly every description of antisocial persons.
There is good reason to believe that antisocial
individuals are generally suspicious of others
because they frequently deceive others.

These
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persons are often interested in others in terms of
how they can be used, and may have a tendency to
project their own dishonest motives onto other
p eople.

They are aware of their own corrupted

honesty, and therefore assume that everyone else acts
as they do

(Field, 1986).

Assuming that antisocial

individuals do not generally trust others,

it

logically follows that they are generally suspicious
of others,

Support for this can be found in a study

conducted by Ekselius et al.

(1994), who studied the

trait of suspicion in association with various
personality disorders.

Evidence for the existence of

trait suspicion was found for antisocial individuals.

Eresent Study
The present study investigated the effects of
primed suspicion and the effects of antisocial
personality traits

(i.e. trait suspicion) on

deception detection accuracy.

It was hypothesized

that the levels of antisocial personality traits and
the levels of primed suspicion would interact.
Individuals low in antisocial personality traits who
were primed to be moderately suspicious and
individuals high in antisocial personality traits who
were not primed to be suspicious were expected to
manifest a superior ability to detect deception than
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individuals in all other groups.

Persons low in

antisocial personality traits who were not primed to
be suspicious were expected to possess poor deception
detection accuracy because previous research has
indicated that low levels of suspicion lead persons
to perceive most messages as being truthful
Higgins,

1984).

(Kraut &

The lack of trait suspicion and

primed suspicion were expected to produce biased
judgments in the direction of truthfulness,
lowering overall accuracy.

thus

Persons high in

antisocial personality traits who were primed to be
moderately suspicious were also expected to possess
poor deception detection accuracy because research
has indicated that individuals who are highly
suspicious are likely to perceive most messages as
being deceptive

(Levine & McCornack,

1989).

The

combination of trait suspicion and primed suspicion
was expected to produce biased judgments in the
direction of deception, thus lowering overall
accuracy.

Alternatively, individuals low in

antisocial personality traits who were primed to be
moderately suspicious were expected to possess a
moderate level of suspicion overall, due to the
absence of trait suspicion and presence of primed
suspicion.

Individuals high in antisocial
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personality traits who were not primed to be
suspicious were also expected to possess a moderate
level of suspicion overall, due to the presence of
trait suspicion and absence of primed suspicion.
These latter two groups possessing moderate levels of
suspicion were expected to manifest a superior
ability to detect deception than individuals in all
other groups.
Additionally,

it was hypothesized that veracity

judgments of individuals who were low in antisocial
personality traits and low in suspicion would,

in

general, be more truthful than veracity judgments of
individuals in the other groups,

regardless of the

actual accuracy of those judgments.

This was

hypothesized because individuals who possess low
levels of suspicion are likely to perceive most
messages as being truthful

(Kraut & Higgins,

1984).

Conversely, veracity judgments of individuals who
were high in antisocial personality traits and who
were primed to become moderately suspicious were
expected to be more deceptive than veracity judgments
of individuals in the other groups,
actual accuracy of those judgments.

regardless of the
This was

reasoned because individuals who are highly

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

27

suspicious are likely to perceive most messages as
being deceptive

(Levine & McCornack,

1989).
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CHAPTER 2
METHOD

Subjects
Participants consisted of 133 college
undergraduates

(4 7 men and 86 women) attending the

University of Nevada, Las Vegas.
participants was 22.7 years.
Caucasian, 12% Asian,

The sample was 67%

9% Hispanic,

American, and 5% other.

The mean age of

7% African-

Participation allowed

students to fulfill course requirements in an
introductory psychology course.

Apparatus
Materials used included a 45-item antisocial
personality scale

(Millon, 1990), three videotapes

comprised of eight segments, and a brief adjective
checklist to assess deception detection accuracy.
The antisocial personality scale was composed of all
items that comprise the Antisocial subscale

(Scale

6A) of the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory-II
(MCMI-II; Millon,

1990; see Appendix I).

The items

relate to various antisocial dispositional traits.

28
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including one item directly associated with
deceiving:

"Frankly,

trouble".

I lie quite often to get out of

The median base rate score for psychiatric

patients on this scale is 60, and the median base
rate score for "normal" individuals is 35.
Internal consistency for nonclinical subjects on
Scale 6A has been found to be approximately .88
(Millon, 1987).

Support for the external validity of

Scale 6A has been measured by the classification
efficacy associated with DSM-III-R (American
Psychiatric Association,
disorders.

1987) diagnosed Axis II

Positive predictive power for the MCMI-II

was found to lie at 68%, negative predictive power at
98%, and overall diagnostic power at 97%
1987).

(Millon,

External validity of Scale 6A has also been

supported by the Millon Personality Diagnostic
Checklist

(MPDC) Descriptive Phrases associated with

this scale.

These phrases have received a

significantly greater endorsement by clinicians in
describing patients with Antisocial Personality
Disorder than the combined endorsement average for
all other scales

(Millon, 1987).

The MPDC phrases

for scale 6A that are directly related to deception,
and thus highly relevant to the present study,
include the following:

lies for

purpose of harming
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others,

disregards the truth and repeatedly lies,

interpersonal conduct:
self-image:

untrustworthy and unreliable,

perceived as shallow and lacking in

genuineness.
Three color videotapes were constructed, each
containing eight different segments, four of which
were "truth conditions" and four of which were "lie
conditions".

Each segment presented a different

individual, or "actor".
and four females.

Actors included four males

Each video segment contained 45 -

60 seconds of verbalization between the experimenter
and actor, who was either truthful or deceptive in
describing a prior job that he or she has held.
Several male and female actors recruited from UNLV
introductory psychology courses were filmed, each in
two conditions, a "truth" condition and a "lie"
condition, providing a total of 24 video segments.
The truth condition consisted of each actor
responding to questions posed by the experimenter
concerning a job he or she has held within the last
ten years.

Actors listed several jobs they had held,

and one was randomly chosen for them to describe.
The experimenter elicited information regarding how
old the actors were at the time of employment, how
long the employment lasted, what their job duties
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were, and whether they liked or disliked the job and
why.

The actors were given no time to practice the

job description prior to the filming session.
The lie condition consisted of

actors

describing a fictitious job assigned to them by the
experimenter.

They were instructed to

try to convince the viewer that they had actually
held the job by answering questions posed by the
experimenter concerning the following points :

how

old they were at the time of employment, how long the
employment lasted, what their job duties were, and
whether they liked or disliked the job and why.

The

actors were given no time to practice the job
description prior to the filming session.
Half of the actors were randomly chosen to
participate in the truth condition first, and the
remaining half participated in the lie condition
first.

Each actor was filmed from the waist up, in a

sitting position, with the camera placed directly in
front of them; the experimenter was not visible.

The

same camera angle was used for each actor, as well as
a standardized backdrop.

Additionally,

each actor

completed the antisocial personality scale
1990).

After all actors were filmed,

(Millon,

eight were

randomly chosen to appear on the videotapes.

Three
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tapes were then constructed, each with eight
segments, presenting the actors in different order
and different conditions

(i.e.

truth or lie

condition).
A final stimulus material presented to subjects
was a dichotomous adjective checklist to assess
various subject perceptions of the actors on
videotape.

All subjects received a handout

containing an adjective checklist for each video,
pertaining to various actor personality
characteristics

(see Appendix II).

Accurate

deception detection was assessed according to subject
response to the "truthful/untruthful" item, and its
correspondence with actual truth or deception.

This

item appeared randomly among the other adjectives.
Pretest of Stimulus Materials
A pretest of fourteen participants was conducted
in order to determine if the suspicion manipulation
would be effective.

Seven subjects were given the

low suspicion instructions :

"This is a study

designed to evaluate first impressions.

You will see

a series of individuals on videotape, and after each
segment, you will be asked to describe the person you
just saw by responding to the attached adjective
checklist".

Seven subjects were given the moderate
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suspicion instructions:

"This is a study designed to

evaluate first impressions.

You will see a series of

individuals on videotape, and after each segment, you
will be asked to describe the person you just saw by
responding to the attached adjective checklist.

As

you view the tape, keep in mind that the people you
see may not be completely truthful in what they're
saying"

(McComack & Levine,

1990) .

After viewing

the videotape and completing the adjective checklist,
subjects were asked to rate their degree of suspicion
on a scale from 1 (no suspicion)
suspicion).

to 9 (extreme

It was found that subjects who were

given instructions designed to evoke moderate
suspicion did manifest a higher level of suspicion
(mean = 5.71) than subjects given instructions
designed to evoke no suspicion (mean = 3.14).

A one

way analysis of variance found the difference between
means to be significant, F,

(1,12) = 6.557, p = .02.

Had the different instructions indicated no effect on
suspicion, a new method of inducing suspicion would
have been developed.

Since the suspicion

manipulation proved to be effective, pretest data was
also used as subject data.
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Procedure
Following the development of the stimulus
materials,

121 subjects were recruited under the

cover story that they would be participating in a
study designed to evaluate first impressions.

All

subjects completed the antisocial personality scale
before viewing the videotape.

A median split based

on subject antisocial personality traits scores
(median = 29) was used to create the high and low
antisocial categories^.

^
The statistical analyses performed on the data were originally conducted using
extreme groups for the antisocial variable; the 40 subjects obtaining the highest scores
were to comprise the high antisocial category, and the 40 subjects obtaining the lowest
scores were to comprise the low antisocial category. All analyses performed using this
division of the antisocial variable revealed nonsignificant results. That is, differences
between the high and low antisocial categories were nonsignificant when suspicion,
veracity judgments, and deception detection accuracy were examined. There are
several plausible explanations for this finding.
One possibility is that the use of the aforementioned "extreme groups" were
not extreme enough to find differences between the two categories. Perhaps the gap
between the high and low groups was simply not wide enough. This explanation is
possible, but not likely considering the fact that several statistical analyses performed
using a median split, obviously entailing less extreme groups, yielded significant
differences between high and low antisocials along the variables of suspicion and
veracity judgments.
Another possible explanation is that the true relationship between varying
levels of antisocial personality traits and suspicion, veracity judgments, and/or
detection accuracy is curvilinear. It is likely that a highly complex relationship exists
between these variables that would require examining the antisocial variable in 1/3's,
and comparing all three groups, rather than just the extremes. For instance,
individuals in the middle antisocial category could manifest more suspicion than
individuals in the high or low antisocial categories.
The most plausible explanation for the lack of statistical significance between
the two antisocial groups is that the sample size was too small. Perhaps a sample size
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Since subjects were likely to demonstrate a
truth bias and assume that actors were being
truthful, three variations of the original videotape
were used, each presenting the same actors in
opposite conditions and in different order.

In this

way, if subjects did have extremely high or low
accuracies for certain conditions,

it could be

determined whether this was due to a truth bias or to
the actors themselves being too easy or difficult to
detect.

Actors that produced average accuracy scores

under 25% or over 75% were to be seen as too
difficult or too easy to detect, respectively.

These

cutoffs were to control for floor and ceiling
effects, and were to provide an adequate range for
subject accuracy comparison.

Actor segments that

were found to be too easy or too difficult were to be
discarded, and the "backup" actor segments were to be
utilized.

It was found that the original actors were

appropriate, creating subject accuracy scores between
25% and 75%.

Additionally, a three-factor analysis

of 180 would have been large enough to allow ample power to reveal a significant
difference between the top one-third and bottom one-third subjects.
Regardless of the true reason(s) behind the lack of significance using extreme
groups divided by one-thirds, it seemed inappropriate to terminate the statistical
analyses at this point, so further analyses were performed using a median split of the
antisocial variable. The results and discussion sections therefore concern results found
with the latter division of the antisocial variable.
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of variance

(high/low antisocial vs. high/low

suspicion vs. videotape)

found that the use of

different videotapes did not significantly affect
subject accuracy.

Suspicion Manipulation
Subjects were randomly assigned to either a low
suspicion condition or a moderate suspicion
condition.

In the low suspicion condition,

subjects

received the following instructions prior to viewing
the videotape:

"This is a study designed to evaluate

first impressions.

You will see a series of

individuals on videotape,

and after each segment, you

will be asked to describe the

person you just saw by

responding to the attached adjective checklist."
In the moderate suspicion condition, subjects
received the following instructions prior to viewing
the videotape:

"This is a study designed to evaluate

first impressions.

You will see a series of

individuals on videotape,

and after each segment, you

will be asked to describe the person you just saw by
responding to the attached adjective checklist.

As

you view the tape, keep in mind that the people you
see may not be completely truthful in what they're
saying"

(McCornack & Levine,

1990).
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After receiving the instructions,

subjects

viewed the videotape, which randomly presented each
actor.

After each segment, participants were

allotted two minutes to complete the adjective
checklist

(see Appendix I I ) .

At the end of the

session, a manipulation check was included to
determine if subject suspicion varied as a function
of the appropriate experimental condition (i.e.
different instructions) .

Subjects were asked to rate

their degree of suspicion on a scale from 1 (no
suspicion)

to 9 (extreme suspicion).

Finally,

subjects were debriefed as to the actual intentions
and nature of the research.
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CHAPTER 3
RESULTS

A number of statistical analyses were conducted.
First, effectiveness of the suspicion manipulation
was determined for the entire study, for both trait
suspicion (i.e.

antisocial personality traits)

state suspicion.

and

Second, veracity judgments were

analyzed in order to ascertain if the suspicion
manipulation and/or level of antisocial personality
traits affected subjects' judgments of truthfulness.
Finally, deception detection accuracy was
investigated to determine if subject suspicion and/or
level of antisocial personality traits affected
actual detection accuracy.
Half of the total subjects participated in the
study in a moderate suspicion condition, and half
participated in a low suspicion condition.

All

subjects completed the antisocial personality traits
scale (Millon,

1990).

The lowest antisocial score

38
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obtained was 3, the highest score was 58, the median
was 29, and the mean was 29.719, SD = 10.63.

A near

perfect normal disribution was obtained for the
antisocial variable.

Suspicion Manipulation
Subject suspicion was examined in the context of
state suspicion and trait suspicion (i.e.
personality traits).

antisocial

It was hypothesized

that individuals high in antisocial personality
traits would be more suspicious than individuals low
in antisocial personality traits, and individuals in
the moderate suspicion condition would be more
suspicious than individuals in the low suspicion
condition.

When scores from the 9-point suspicion

scale were analyzed in a 2 (high vs. low suspicion) x
2 (high vs. low antisocial traits) ANOVA, the expected
main effects were obtained.

These two expected

effects were found to be significant; Antisocial,
(1, 117) = 7.424, p = .007; Suspicion, F,
8.473, p = .004

(see Figure 1).

(1, 117)

F,
=

No significant

interaction between antisocial personality traits and
suspicion was found.

Veracity Judgments
Veracity judgments were analyzed in order to
ascertain if antisocial personality traits and/or
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State suspicion affected subjects'
truthfulness,
accuracy.

judgments of

irrespective of actual detection

Veracity judgments were computed by

summing the number of times each subject circled the
"truthful" item in the adjective checklist handout,
thus subjects could receive a maximum of eight total
veracity judgments.

It was hypothesized that

individuals low in antisocial personality traits and
low in suspicion would have more judgments of
truthfulness than individuals in the other groups.
Conversely,

individuals high in antisocial

personality traits and individuals who were primed to
be moderately suspicious were expected to have fewer
judgments of truthfulness than individuals in the
other groups.

Subjects who were primed to be

moderately suspicious had a mean veracity level of
6.183, SD = 1.48;

subjects who were not primed to be

suspicious had a mean veracity level of 6.885, SD =
1.34.

An analysis of variance found a significant

main effect for suspicion, with those individuals who
were primed to be moderately suspicious manifesting a
significantly higher number of judgments of deception
than individuals who were not primed to be
suspicious, F,

(1,117) = 8.08, p = .005.

The main

effect for antisocial personality traits was
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nonsignificant, as was the interaction between
suspicion and antisocial personality traits.
When gender was examined in conjunction with
suspicion condition and antisocial personality traits
using a 2 (high v s . low suspcion) x 2 (high v s . low
antisocial traits) x 2 (male vs. female) ANOVA, a
three-factor interaction was found, P,
8.332, p= .005 ^ .

(1, 113) =

For males, as suspicion went from

"low" to "moderate", veracity judgments tended to
decrease for individuals low in antisocial
personality traits, and stayed the same for
individuals high in antisocial personality traits, F,
(1,113) = 2.91, p= .09 (see Figure 2).

For females,

as suspicion went from "low" to "moderate", veracity
judgments tended to decrease for individuals high in
antisocial personality traits and stayed the same for
individuals low in antisocial personality traits, F,
(1, 113) = 6.33, p= .01 (see Figure 3).
Deception.Detection Accuracy
Deception detection accuracy was assessed
according to subject response to the
"truthful/untruthful" item on the adjective
checklist, and its correspondence with actual truth

2lt should be noted that gender was also added to the other analyses reported, but in
these analyses it was not involved with any significant effects.
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or deception.

Subjects received one point for

correctly responding to each video segment,

thus each

subject could receive a maximum of eight points for
the entire videotape.

Each subject's total number

correct was divided by eight to obtain their video
accuracy sc o r e .

The minimum score received by any

subject was 25%, the maximum score was 100%, and the
mean score of all subjects was 54%, similar to the
findings of many other studies conducting deception
research (i.e.

Lavrakas & Maier,

1979, 54 percent ;

Matarazzo et al., 1970, 59 percent).
Subject detection accuracy was examined in order
to determine if suspicion and/or antisocial
personality traits affected subject detection
accuracy.

It was hypothesized that individuals low

in antisocial

personality traits who were primed to

be moderately suspicious and individuals high in
antisocial personality traits who were not primed to
be suspicious would manifest a superior accuracy in
detecting deception than individuals in all other
groups.

Persons low in antisocial personality traits

who were not primed to be
in antisocial

suspicious and persons high

personality traits who were primed to

be moderately suspicious were expected to possess
poor deception detection accuracy in relation to
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individuals in the other groups.

When accuracy

scores were analyzed in a 2 (high vs.

low suspicion)

X 2 (high vs. low antisocial traits) ANOVA, the main
effects for antisocial personality traits and
suspicion were nonsignificant, as was the interaction
between suspicion and antisocial personality traits.
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CHAPTER 4
DISCUSSION

Suspicion Manipulation
The suspicion manipulation was found to be
effective,

causing those individuals in the moderate

suspicion condition to manifest a significantly
higher level of suspicion than those individuals in
the no suspicion condition.

This finding replicates

that found by M c C o m a c k and Levine

(1990) , when using

the same instructions to induce a moderate level of
suspicion, they also found the manipulation to be
effective.
The more interesting finding concerning
suspicion is the confirmation of the hypothesis that
persons high in antisocial personality traits would
manifest higher levels of suspicion than persons low
in antisocial traits.

One explanation for this

"trait suspicion" concerns the "projection"
rationale.

Since antisocial individuals are

notorious for lying, and they frequently use, con.

44
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and deceive others, they may have a tendency to
project their own deceitfulness onto other people
(Field, 1986) ,

An individual who assumes others are

generally dishonest is an individual who tends to be
distrustful of other people, which by definition,
constitutes one who is suspicious of others.

In sum,

persons high in antisocial personality traits
frequently deceive others, project this behavior onto
other people, and therefore are distrustful and
suspicious of others.
Another reason why individuals high in
antisocial traits may be suspicious of others is that
many of them have come from "broken, impoverished
homes and have experienced some form of parental loss
and rejection..."

(Hare, 1970, p. 109).

Depending on

the severity of the situation, growing up in an
unstable, unpredictable environment would tend to
create a certain level of distrust in a person, not
only for the environment in general, but also for
people in general.

Having learned that the

environment is unstable and people cannot be trusted,
it logically follows that antisocial individuals
would generally be wary of their surroundings and
suspicious of other people.

The finding of trait

suspicion in the present study replicated that found
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by Ekselius

(1994), who also discovered evidence for

the existence of trait suspicion for antisocial
individuals.
Further,

the main effects found for suspicion

condition (i.e.

state suspicion) and antisocial

personality traits

(i.e.

trait suspicion)

on

reported subject suspicion level seem to support an
additive relationship between various types of
suspicion (see Figure 1).

This also provides support

for McCornack and Levine's

(1990) criticism of the

"all-or-none" approach to operationalizing suspicion.
The present study and M c C o m a c k and Levine's

(1990)

study both provide support for the existence of
various levels of suspicion, that it should not be
conceptualized simply by its existence or
nonexistence.

It seems that a complex interplay

between person variables and situation variables can
modify a person's overall level of suspicion.

Future

researchers should perhaps consider dealing with
suspicion in a different manner, rather than
operationalizing it dichotomously.

Yexa.ci.ty -Judgments
One of the original hypotheses regarding
veracity judgments was supported in the present
study.

It was hypothesized that veracity judgments
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of those who were low in suspicion would be more
truthful than veracity judgments of those who were
moderately suspicious.

A significant difference was

found between the two suspicion conditions, in
support of the aforementioned hypothesis.

This

provides additional support that the suspicion
manipulation worked well, causing individuals in the
moderate suspicion condition to have fewer judgments
of veracity than individuals who were not primed to
be suspicious.

This finding is similar to that found

by Toris & DePaulo

(1985) and Stiff, Kim, and Ramesh

(1992), in that primed suspicion produces fewer
judgment s o f t ruthfulne ss .
It was also hypothesized that persons high in
antisocial traits would have fewer veracity judgments
than persons low in antisocial traits.

This was

reasoned on the basis of the existence of trait
suspicion in persons high in antisocial personality
traits ; it was expected that individuals who were
trait suspicious would make fewer veracity judgments
than individuals who were not trait suspicious.
main effect,

This

however puzzling, was not significant,

and thus failed to support the hypothesis.
A possible reason for the lack of significant
differences in veracity judgments between individuals
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high and low in antisocial personality traits is that
perhaps in this experimental situation,

trait

suspicion was just simply not as powerful in
affecting subject judgments as was state suspicion
(or lack o f ) .

Perhaps the situation was more likely

to dictate cognitions/behavior than were underlying
personality traits.

In forming veracity judgments,

several factors come into play,

including personality

of the detector, personality of the deceiver,

and

factors concerning the situation under which the
deception occurs.

Without a reason to believe the

actors would be lying, persons high in antisocial
traits could have been more influenced by the
situation (i.e.

"This is just a psychology

experiment...") than by an underlying trait of
suspicion (i.e.
lying...").

"I wonder if these people are

Therefore, although these individuals

felt suspicious of the actors, perhaps they did not
feel strong enough about their suspicion to judge the
actors as being untruthful.
Gender was found to have no significant main
effect on veracity judgments, consistent with results
found in other studies (see Zuckerman, et al., 1981;
McCornack & Parks,

1986; Stiff et al., 1992).

However, a significant interaction was found between
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gender,

suspicion, and antisocial personality traits

(see Figures 2 and 3).

As suspicion increased for

low antisocial males, veracity judgments decreased;
as suspicion increased for high antisocial females,
veracity judgments decreased.

As suspicion

increases, veracity judgments should, in theory,
decrease for all subjects, not just low antisocial
males and high antisocial females.

So the peculiar

finding is that veracity judgments stayed the same as
suspicion increased for high antisocial males and low
antisocial females.
A possible reason for this finding with females
is that women who are low in antisocial personality
traits may be more trusting than men who are low in
such traits, and therefore, even when primed to
become suspicious,
veracity judgments.

such women do not make fewer
Perhaps these women are so

lacking in trait suspicion that it would take a
stronger suspicion manipulation to increase their
judgments of deception.
A possible explanation for this finding with
males is that men who are high in antisocial
personality traits may be less influenced by or more
oppositional towards the instructions designed to
decrease their veracity judgments than their female
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counterparts.

Since these men did not exhibit a

floor effect with veracity judgments,

it is not the

case that they were so highly suspicious that they
couldn't make fewer veracity judgments.

This finding

makes the interaction very difficult to explain.
Deception Detection Accuracy
None of the original hypotheses concerning
detection accuracy were supported.

That is,

suspicion, antisocial personality traits,

and the

interaction between the two had no effect on actual
detection accuracy.

There are several possible

explanations for the lack of significant differences
in accuracy between individuals with various levels
of suspicion.
It has often been hypothesized in deception
research that suspicious individuals become more
attentive to cues that should enhance their deception
detection success

(Toris & DePaulo,

1985).

One

possible reason this did not occur in the present
study is that such cues to deception may not have
been attended to by the subjects.

A main reason for

this is that subjects may not have been motivated to
correctly detect deception (Zuckerman et al., 1981).
To illustrate,

subjects were not even aware of the

actual nature of research until they were debriefed.
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They were under the impression they were
participating in a study designed to evaluate first
impressions,

so they weren't necessarily looking for

cues to deception, and consequently didn't find them.
Subjects also may not have been highly motivated to
detect deception accurately because they had no real
incentive to; participants were not rewarded in any
way for correctly ascertaining deception.
Another possible reason suspicious subjects did
not successfully utilize leaked cues is that perhaps
they relied on false cues to deception.

There exists

several discrepancies between actual cues to
deception and perceived cues to deception,
when the deceiver shifts posture often,

such as

smiles less,

gazes less, takes longer to answer a question, and
speaks slower (Zuckerman et al., 1981).

Subjects who

viewed such cues as being actual cues to deception
would have more than likely incorrectly assessed
deception, thereby lowering overall accuracy.
Assuming individuals high in antisocial
personality traits are more suspicious than those low
in antisocial personality traits, the aforementioned
reasons could also be used as possible explanations
for the lack of significant differences between the
antisocial groups.

Putting this aside, another
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possible reason no group differences were found is
that we really weren't looking at groups that were
extreme enough when divided by the median split to
demonstrate an effect for the antisocial variable.
But even when the subjects were divided into onethirds, no effect was found for extreme groups along
the antisocial variable.

Consider the possibility

that an effect for this variable cannot be found
within a student population.

In other words, running

more subjects and examining more extreme groups may
not find an effect, either.

Perhaps a significant

effect would only be found for true antisocial
individuals

(i.e. those diagnosed with Antisocial

Personality Disorder), not just those high in
antisocial personality traits.
Along with the main effects for suspicion and
antisocial personality traits, the interaction
between these variables proved to be nonsignificant
as well.

One reason that has already been discussed

concerns subject failure to successfully utilize
deception cues, thereby producing no effect for
suspicion on accuracy.

A second possible explanation

is that the relationship between trait suspicion,
assuming it exists for those high in antisocial
personality traits, and state suspicion is very
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complex.

Although it may be additive in nature,

assigning weights to each is clearly an imprecise,
subjective task.

Additionally, deception detection

itself is very complex, requiring substantial
interplay between person variaüDles and situation
variables; accurately pinpointing how much effect one
factor had versus another is a highly convoluted
process.
Methodological weaknesses of this study include
a non-representative sample, reliance on a selfreport antisocial measure

(MCMI-II), and the use of

only two levels of state suspicion.

The sample

chosen for the study consisted solely of University
of Nevada, Las Vegas undergraduates.

It was hoped

that among such individuals, a large spread of
antisocial scores would be obtained.
spread seemed appropriate,

Although the

the maximum score obtained

on the antisocial measure was 58, just below the
median base rate score for psychiatric patients on
this scale.

Although the aim of the study was not

necessarily to utilize truly antisocial individuals,
the sample could have been at least more
representative of such persons.
Additionally,
measure,

reliance on the self-report

the MCMI-II, may not have elicited complete
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honesty from participants.

Subjects may have felt

uncomfortable about responding truthfully to some of
the items

(see Appendix I) , and therefore may have

prevented us from obtaining a true picture of
antisocial traits within the sample.
Another methodological weakness includes the
reliance on only two levels of state suspicion.
Three levels of primed suspicion may have provided a
more complete picture of the effects of state
suspicion on reported suspicion level, veracity
judgments,

and deception detection accuracy.

It also

may have shed more light on the relationship between
trait suspicion and state suspicion.
In summary, this study replicates previous
studies regarding the finding of evidence for trait
suspicion among persons high in antisocial
personality traits, the lack of effect for suspicion
on deception detection accuracy, and the overall
finding that humans are relatively poor detectors of
deception.

One suggestion for future research

includes using a larger sample size, which would
allow the possibility of finding significant
differences between persons of differing age and
ethnicity.

Such differences could possibly be found

when examining antisocial scores, trait suspicion.
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veracity judgments, and/or detection accuracy.
Additionally,

in light of the widespread occurence

and substantial impact of deception on personal
interactions, a paramount direction for future
research lies in improving human ability to detect
deception.
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APPENDIX

PERSONALITY TRAITS SCALE

GENDER :

AGE :

RACE :

INSTRUCTIONS:
Please answer the following questions
TRUE or FALSE.
If you agree with a statement or feel
that it describes you, answer TRUE.
If you disagree
with a statement or feel that it does not describe
you, answer FALSE.
Please try to answer every
question.
1.
I always follow my own ideas rather than do what
others expect of m e .
2. As a teenager, I got into lots of trouble because
of bad school behavior.
3. Sometimes I can be pretty rough and mean in my
relations with my family.
4.
I know I'm a superior person, so I don't care
what people think.
5.
I will often do things for no reason other than
they might be fun.
6.
If my family puts pressure on me. I'm likely to
feel angry and resist doing what they want.

56
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7.
I protect myself from trouble by never letting
people know much about m e .
8. Other people get more angry about bothersome
things than I do.
9. Under no circumstances do I ever let myself be
tricked by people who say they need help.
10.
In the past I've gotten involved sexually with
many people who didn't matter much to me.
11.

I am a very agreeable and submissive person.

12. My own "bad temper" has been a big cause of my
troubles.
13.
I don't mind bullying others to get them to do
what I wan t .
14.
I like to flirt with members of the opposite
sex.
15.
I strongly resent "big shots" who always think
they can do things better than I can.
16.
If someone criticized me for making a mistake,
would quickly point out some of that person's
mistakes.
17.
I've done a number of stupid things on impulse
that ended up causing me great trouble.
18.
I never forgive an insult or forget an
embarrassment that someone caused me.
19.
I am the sort of person that others take
advantage o f .
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20.
I always try hard to please others, even when I
dislike them.
21.
I quickly figure out how people are trying to
cause me trouble.
22.
I've always had less interest in sex than most
people do.
23.
Since I was a child, I have always had to watch
out for people who were trying to cheat me.
24.
When things get boring,
excitement.

I like to stir up some

25.
I have an alcohol problem that has made
difficulties for me and ray family.
26.
I don't see anything wrong with using people to
get what I want.
27.
Punishment never stopped me from doing what I
wanted.
28.
I ran away from home as a teenager at least
once.
29.
I don't know why, but I sometimes say cruel
things just to make others unhappy.
30.
I speak out my opinions about things no matter
what others may think.
31.
When someone in authority insists that I do
something. I'm likely to put it off or do it poorly
on purpose.
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32.
I use my charm to get the attention of other
people.
33. I feel pretty aimless and don't know where I'm
going in life.
34. I've been unfairly punished by the law for
crimes I never committed.
35. I don't blame anyone who takes advantage of
someone who allows it.
36. I've changed jobs more than three times in the
last couple of years.
37. My use of so-called illegal drugs has led to
family arguments.
38. There are members of my family who say I'm
selfish and think only of myself.
39. Frankly,
trouble.
40.

I lie quite often to get out of

My parents often told me that I was no good.

41. On occasion I have had as many as ten or more
drinks without becoming drunk.
42. I used to be really restless, traveling around
from place to place with no idea of where I would end
up.
43. I get very irritated if someone demands that I
do things his way rather than my own.
44.
People who I admired greatly at first have often
become real disappointments to me later.
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45.
I'm the kind of person who can walk up to anyone
and tell him or her off.

N o t e ■ From the Millon Clinical Multiaxial InventoryII, by T. Millon, 1990, Minneapolis, MN: National
Computer Systems, Inc.
Copyright 1990 by Theodore Millon, PhD.
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APPENDIX II

ADJECTIVE CHECKLIST

INSTRUCTIONS : Please circle one number in each pair
of adjectives that most accurately describes the
person in the video you just saw.

unassertive

2 assertive

anxious

2 relaxed

truthful

2 untruthful

enthusiastic

1

2 unenthusiastic

unemotional

2 emotional

confident

2 unconfident

unhappy

2 happy

extroverted

2 introverted
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APPENDIX III

FIGURES
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Figure 1. Mean repeated suspicion level for subjects high and low in antisocial traits in
the iow and moderate suspicion conditions.
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Figure 2. Mean veracity judgments for males high and low in antisociai traits in the iow
and moderate suspicion conditions.
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Figure 3. Mean veracity judgments for females high and low in antisocial traits in the
low and moderate suspicion conditions.
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APPENDIX IV

HUMAN SUBJECTS PROTOCOL FORM

DATE:

TO:
FROM:
RE:

September 21, 1995
Barbara SchoephOerster (PSY)
M/S 5030
\filliam E. Schulze, Director
^tfffice of Sponsored Programs (X1357)
(' Status of Human Sub]ect Protocol Entitled:
"Individual Differences in the Detection of
Inaccurate Information"
OSP #113s0995-056e

The protocol for the project referenced above has been reviewed by
the Office of Sponsored Programs, and it has been determined that
it meets the criteria for exemption from full review by the UNLV
human subjects Instititnal Review Board.
Except for any required
conditions or modifications noted below, this protocol is approved
for a period of one year from the date of this notification, and
work on the project may proceed.
Should the use of human subjects described in this protocol
continue beyond a year from the date of this notification, it will
be necessary to request an extension.

cc:

M Millar
OSP File

(PSY-5030)

4505 Maryland

Office of Sponsored Programs
Parkway • Box 451037 • Las Vegas, Nevada
(702) 895-1357 • FAX (702) 895-4242

89154-1037
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